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A PROHIBITION ON DISCRETION UNDER
SECTION 304(b) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
by Sarika Kapoor*

INTRODUCTION

Bankruptcy law is designed to allow creditors to vindicate their rights
in a single forum where the debtor's affairs can be sorted out.' This body of law
seeks to protect creditors and to ensure the maximum possible return on their
investment when the debtor/borrower files for bankruptcy. 2 The law is designed
to give creditors some incentive to lend money to debtors who may never repay
them. The procedure that bankruptcy law follows reassures creditors that the
debtor does not have, nor is attempting to hide other assets. Bankruptcy law
concerns itself with the creditors' ability to use laws to recover what they are
owed. Outside bankruptcy, creditors are limited in what they can do to collect
on their loans. It is primarily for this reason that creditors are concerned that4
they receive the due priority of their claim when the debtor files for bankruptcy.

* Ms. Kapoor is a student at the Hofstra University School of Law. She would like to express her
deep gratitude to Professor Alan Resnick of the Hofstra University School of Law for his guidance,
encouragement and invaluable expertise in bringing this Note to fruition.

1DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 21 (3d ed., Foundation Press 2001).
2 L. KING & M. COOK, CREDITORS' RIGHTS, DEBTORS' PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY 777 (1985)
(As a generalization, the bankruptcy law has two basic purposes: (1) to provide an equitable
distribution to unsecured creditors of the proceeds from the debtor's nonexempt property; and, (2) to
provide the honest debtor with a discharge from the debts or, stated somewhat differently, to permit
the honest debtor a new financial life).
3 BAIRD, supra note 1, 34.
4 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978 (THE "BANKRUPTCY CODE" OR THE "CODE") § 707(b), 11
U.S.C. §§101-151, 326 (2002). § 707(b) of the Bankruptcy Code allows the bankruptcy judge to
deny debtors a fresh start if the fresh start would work a substantial abuse of the bankruptcy process.
11 U.S.C. § 707(b) provides, in complete form, as follows:
After notice and a hearing, the court, on its own motion or on a motion by the United States trustee,
but not at the request or suggestion of any party in interest, may dismiss a case filed by an individual
debtor under this chapter whose debts are primarily consumer debts if it finds that the granting of
relief would be a substantial abuse of the provisions of this chapter. There shall be a presumption in
favor of granting the relief requested by the debtor. In making a determination whether to dismiss a
case under this section, the court may not take into consideration whether a debtor has made, or
continues to make, charitable contributions [that meet the definition of "charitable contribution"
under section 548(d)(3)] to any qualified religious or charitable entity or organization [as that term is
defined in section 548(dX4)].
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From this perspective, therefore, creditors' rights and remedies should be
emphasized.5
The United States Bankruptcy Code does not limit itself to the debts of
an individual debtor; corporations, too, may file.6 The eligibility requirements
of section 109(a) are also applicable to an insolvency proceeding, including
liquidation and reorganization. 7 Generally, all interested parties8 would prefer
seeing the corporate entity continue in existence if it is at all possible to save the
business. 9 Consequently, Chapter 1110 is often the preferred solution for
corporate debtors because it keeps people employed, promises a higher return
and more money to creditors than liquidation, and corporate shares may retain
some value.
The legislative history is replete with discussions of developing
policies to "protect the investing public, protect jobs, and help save troubled
businesses."" This helps further "overriding community goals and values" in
bankruptcy 12 of "the public interest" beyond the interests of the claimants. 3 The
legislative history also acknowledges that
it is more "economically efficient" to
14
reorganize than to liquidate a company.
Often, many American companies incorporate in a foreign jurisdiction
in order to reap the maximum tax benefits possible in tax haven jurisdictions

5BAIRD, supra note 1, 33 (While bankruptcy law seeks to provide creditors with remedies to collect
on their investments, it also provides debtors with a fresh start. "Bankruptcy law allows creditors to
scrutinize the debtor's affairs and, assuming no misbehavior is found, provides the debtor with a
fresh start.").
6 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2002). Section 109(a) sets forth who may file for relief under the United States
Bankruptcy Code. This section, read in conjunction with Section 101(41) defining "person" confirm
that a person includes a corporation. 11 U.S.C. §109(a) provides, in complete form, as follows:
"109. Who may be a debtor
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, only a person that resides or has a domicile,
a place of business, or property in the United States, or a municipality, may be a debtor under this
title."
See id.
E.g., creditors, employees, stockholders.
9Brian A. Blum, The GoalsAnd Process OfReorganizingSmall Businesses In Bankruptcy, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 181,223-24 (2000) ("The reason society may wish to see these
businesses survive also seems self-evident at first glance: If the business is kept alive, there is a
greater prospect that it will generate returns that will increase creditor recovery. Moreover, one may
hope for benefits beyond that from survival of the business. Its rehabilitation may salvage all or
some of the investment of its owners (whose interests in its survival are, of course, subservient to the
claims of its creditors, but are nevertheless compelling), preserve all or some of its workers' jobs,
and contribute to the well-being of the community in which it operates and to the economy at
large.").
1oChapter 11 was enacted to further goals apart from the mere enhancement of claimants' wealth.
" 124 CONG. REC. 32,392 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); see 123 CONG. REC. 35,444 (1977)
(statement of Rep. Rodino) ("For businesses, the bill facilitates organization, protecting investments
and jobs.").
2

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R.REP. NO.

595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1977).
'" 124 CONG. REC. 33,990 (1978) (statement of Sen. De Concini).
14See supra note 11.
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abroad.'5 Regardless of why they seek to incorporate in an off-shore
jurisdiction, generally, these same companies continue to conduct business in6
the United States and identify America as their principal place of business.'
For this reason, not only are their assets in the United States, but more
importantly, their creditors are in the States as well. Since most creditors are
located in America, the United States has a compelling interest in ensuring the
administration of the ailing foreign corporation.
Under the American
bankruptcy system, simply by owning property 7 in the United States, foreign
incorporated corporations become eligible for filing bankruptcy in the States. I8
Unfortunately, however, America has no mechanism of compelling these
corporations to file bankruptcy in the United States. 19 The current United States
Bankruptcy Code20 recognizes that the state of incorporation, i.e., the foreign
country, is also an acceptable place to dissolve the corporate entity.2 '
Where the principal bankruptcy proceeding is in the foreign country,
the foreign representative 22 typically seeks to hold creditors (located anywhere)
at bay while sorting through the debtor's affairs and thoroughly administering
the proceedings. A foreign representative must meet the Code criteria for the
position. Then the foreign representative can utilize the four options to assist in
protecting and administering assets of the foreign debtor located in the United
States. First, the foreign representative can file a petition under Code § 304 to
commence a case ancillary to the foreign proceedings (the "Ancillary
Proceeding").23 Second, the foreign representative can file an involuntary
petition under Code § 303(b)(4) to commence either a full chapter 7 liquidation
proceeding or a chapter 11 reorganization proceeding. 24 Third, the foreign
15

A tax shelter is defined in several sections of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). One general

definition is a "plan or arrangement if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity, plan or
arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax." I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii)(III)
(2002). The term "tax haven" specifically refers to a country which imposes little or no tax on
income earned domestically or in foreign countries. See generally Connie Guang-Hwa Yang, Note,
Taiwan's Control Of The Tax Sheltering Use Of Tax Haven Base Companies: Substance Over Form
Rule Or SubpartF-Type Legislation?, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 231 (1993).
16 It
should also be noted that often these corporations are multi-national corporations. For all intents
and purposes, these corporations have as their "home" jurisdiction a state of incorporation other than
the United States. For a fuller discussion on "home" jurisdictions and transnational insolvencies,
see, generally Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach To TransnationalInsolvencies, 19 MICH. J.
INT'LL. 1(1997).
17Real property at the very least.
18See supra note 7.
19This Note highlights the significance of having a company file bankruptcy in the United States.
2
0BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978, supra, note 4.
21 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2002) provides, in complete form, as follows:
"[Floreign proceeding" means proceeding, whether judicial or administrative and whether or not
under bankruptcy law, in a foreign country in which the debtor's domicile, residence, principal place
of business, or principal assets were located at the commencement of such proceeding, for the
purpose of liquidating an estate, adjusting debts by composition, extension, or discharge, or effecting
a reorganization."
2 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2002) (A foreign representative is a "duly selected trustee, administrator or
other representative of an estate in a foreign proceeding.").
" 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2002).
2411 U.S.C. § 303(b)(4) (2002). See also infra note 113.
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representative can commence a voluntary petition under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
pursuant to Code § 301.25 Fourth, the foreign representative can seek dismissal
of a pending bankruptcy case or suspension of all pending bankruptcy
proceedings under Code § 305(a)(2).26
11 U.S.C. § 304 governs cases filed in bankruptcy courts that are
ancillary to foreign proceedings.27 Section 304 deals with cross border
insolvency proceedings. Because a section 304 proceeding does not commence
a full bankruptcy case with all of the protections and benefits for a debtor that a
full proceeding affords, the bankruptcy court saw no need to engraft the
29
28
eligibility requirements of section 109(a) onto a section 304 proceeding.
This is because it is only an ancillary proceeding that is designed primarily to
supplement the principal bankruptcy proceeding abroad.3 °
11 U.S.C § 304(b) provides, in complete form, as follows:
Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in
interest does not timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court
mayenjoin the commencement or continuation of(A)
any action against(i)
a debtor with respect to property
involved
in
such
foreign
proceeding; or
(ii)
such property; or
(B)
the enforcement of any judgment against the
debtor with respect to such property, or any
act or the commencement or continuation of
any judicial proceeding to create or enforce
a lien against the property of such estate;
order turnover of the property of such estate, or the
proceeds of such property, to such foreign
representative; or
order other appropriate relief.

(1)

(2)

(3)

Under this section, the foreign representative must affimnatively request
injunctive or other relief in order to preserve the status quo while the affairs of
the corporate debtor are sorted out.3 1 Without personal jurisdiction over the
creditor, the enjoinment of creditor action against the debtor and its assets under
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code cannot be enforced.32 The foreign

2511 U.S.C. § 301 (2002).

'6 11 U.S.C. § 305(a)(2) (2002).
27See supra note 23.
28See supra note 7.
29In

re Brierley, 145 BR. 151, 160 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992).

30See supra note 23.
3"See id.
32 Fotochrome,

Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512., 516 (2d. Cir. 1975).
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representative seeks the assistance of the United States courts by asking that an
injunction, similar to the scope of an automatic stay 33 be implemented. This
helps stop individual creditors located in America, who are not bound to the
laws of the foreign jurisdiction, from taking actions that would thwart the
reorganization or the liquidation of the foreign incorporated debtor
corporation. 34 Thus, if an affirmative request for an ancillary proceeding is not
made by the foreign representative, upon notice of a bankruptcy proceeding
abroad, American creditors would be able to attach to the debtor's assets located
in America in order to satisfy their claims. Clearly, this would not assist the
administration of the bankrupt's estate.35
36
Under Section 304 of the Code, the Bankruptcy Judge has discretion
in determining whether or not the United States will then (upon request)
cooperate with the bankruptcy laws of the foreign jurisdiction in administering
the foreign incorporated debtor's estate.37 Generally, the United States
bankruptcy courts will look at the factors set forth in 11 U.S.C. §304(c) to
determine whether or not to become an arm of the bankruptcy court of the
foreign jurisdiction.
If the foreign representative chooses not to request such relief,
alternatively he can file a full scale involuntary petition in American courts
under 11 U.S.C. §303(b)(4) 38 which would then trigger an automatic stay. 39 An
involuntary proceeding means that a principal proceeding would be in the
3311 U.s.c. §362 (2002). "Automatic stay" is defined as the statutory bar (that becomes effective

immediately upon the filing of a voluntary petition under the Code) on "all debt collection efforts
against the debtor or property of his bankruptcy estate" on account of a debt arising before the
bankruptcy petition was filed. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 134 (6th ed. 1990). There is, however, a
lengthy list of exceptions to the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. §362(b) (2002).
In
addition, creditors can request relief from the stay. Sections 362(d)(1) and (2) provide, in relevant
part, as follows:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the
stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or
conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such party in
interest; [or]
(2) with respect to a stay against property under subsection (a) of this section, if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. Id. §362(d)(1), (2).
3 BAIRD, supra note 1, 169
35See id.("Allowing creditors to take action during the bankruptcy proceeding would undermine
bankruptcy's pro rata sharing rule.").
6 11 U.S.C. §304(c) (2002) (outlining 6 factors).
31 11 U.S.C. §304(b) ("Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if a party in interest
does not timely controvert the petition, or after trial, the court may....")(emphasis added).
38
See supra note 24 (This section governs involuntary cases commenced "by a foreign
representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning such person.").
39Practicing Law Institute PLI Order No. A4-4282 November-December 1989 The Basics of
Bankruptcy and Reorganization 1989 BAsICS OF STAY OF COLLECTION ACTIVITIES David G.

Epstein 517 PLI/Comm 633, 635 (The filing of a voluntary petition under Chapter 7, Chapter 11,
Chapter 12, or Chapter 13, or the filing of an involuntary petition under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11
automatically "stays," i.e., restrains, creditors from taking further action against the debtor, the
property of the debtor, or the property of the estate to collect their claims or enforce their liens.).
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United States and the American Bankruptcy laws would control. Although filed
much less frequently than voluntary cases, the laws of the United States relating
to bankruptcy authorize qualified creditors to take the initiative and file
involuntary petitions against certain debtors who fail to pay their debts.40 Thus,
under appropriate circumstances, creditors can force debtors into the federal
bankruptcy courts.
Generally, American creditors prefer that the proceeding take place in
the United States. 41 The familiarity of the United States system makes it easier
to accept the determination of a bankruptcy proceeding by an American trustee.
Familiarity with the fair and respected policies of American bankruptcy law also
allows for an efficient administration of the estate- one that is not only tolerated
but accepted by creditors in America. American law is also preferred when
adjudicating these claims merely because it is convenient. Undoubtedly, it is
easier for a creditor to participate in a bankruptcy proceeding in the United
States as opposed to a foreign jurisdiction. For these reasons, American
creditors urge for their claims to be adjudicated under American bankruptcy law.
This Note contemplates and limits the proposed remedy to the
following situation: the debtor corporation is incorporated in a foreign
jurisdiction. Despite the foreign state of incorporation, its principal place of
business remains in the United States. The majority of its assets, property, and
creditors are also located in the States. However, the official state of
incorporation remains a jurisdiction other than one that is subject to and bound
by the bankruptcy laws of the United States. As such, the debtor corporation,
rather than filing a bankruptcy petition in the United States, files the insolvency
proceeding in the foreign state. On behalf of the foreign state, the foreign
representative affirmatively requests the United States to implement a stay and
become an arm of the bankruptcy court of the foreign jurisdiction.
Part I of this Note will explore the background of the current state of
bankruptcy law as it involves foreign proceedings and urge for a nondiscretionary regimen. Part II of this Note will examine Section 304(c) factors
and analyze the different approaches taken by the American courts in deciding
various requests for relief. Part III will propose the benefits, as well as the
drawbacks, of adhering to a non-discretionary regimen in administering the
assets located in America of a debtor filing the principal bankruptcy proceeding
in a foreign nation. Finally, Part IV analyzes the effects of such an approach
together with a forthcoming solution-legislation proposed by the United States

40 See supra note 36.
41Practicing Law Institute PLI Order No. A4-4316 September 13-14, 1990 International

Commercial Agreements 1990: Handling Basic Problems in Negotiating, Drafting, and Litigating
BANKRUPTCY AND THE PROBLEMS OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL WORKOUTS Martin N. Flics Michael

J. Ireland 553 PLI/Comm 175 ("Both U.S. debtors and creditors may prefer U.S. bankruptcy
jurisdiction because familiarity with the U.S. system may make it easier to gauge the results of a
bankruptcy here. In addition, it would probably be more convenient for a U.S. party to participate in
a bankruptcy administered in the United States, and the automatic stay is probably farther reaching
than any stay that could be obtained in a foreign court.").
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House of Representatives 42 which seeks to affect the way said ancillary
proceedings are initiated and conducted in United States courts. Congress seeks
to adopt a new Chapter 15 to the Code to govern ancillary cases and other cross
border insolvency matters via this legislation.

I.

CURRENT STATE OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW-1l

U.S.C. §304

The present Bankruptcy Code recognizes the need to maintain a fair
relationship between debtors and creditors. 43 One of the primary concerns of
the Bankruptcy Code is to protect and preserve the rights of creditors. 44 Under
section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, a foreign representative is permitted to
institute a proceeding in the United States ancillary to a foreign bankruptcy
action. 45 This section essentially opens the United States Bankruptcy courts to
proceedings ancillary to foreign insolvency proceedings, where the entity that is
subject to foreign proceedings qualifies for insolvency administration under
foreign law, but does not fall within the Code's definition of "debtor." Section
304 allows the bankruptcy court to enjoin any action or proceeding in the United
States against the debtor with respect to property involved in the foreign
proceeding or against such property, to require the turnover of property 46
of the
estate to the foreign representative, or to order any other appropriate relief.
The objective of turning over property or granting any other relief is to
allow the foreign representative to seize the property located in America and
thereafter distribute the property through the processes of the foreign
proceeding. Once a claim by a foreign representative is filed in American courts,
Section 304 (b) provides for various remedies including an order to turnover the
property to the foreign representative for administration by all creditors.47
However, the turnover of property remedy is subject to the provisions of section
304(c). 48 Thus, while the court is permitted under subsection (b) to order the
turnover of such property in order to administer the assets located in America,
and to prevent dismemberment by local creditors of assets located here,49 under
42

BANKRUPTCY ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2001, H.R. 333, CONF.

REP. 333, 107 t hCong. §801(2001).
41 11 U.S.C. § 101(10) (2002). The Code defines a creditor as an entity that has a claim against the
debtor which arose at the time of or before the order of relief concerning the debtor, and in certain
conditions, even after the petition was filed. A "claim" means the right to payment whether or not
such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,
disputed undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured, or the right to an equitable remedy. 11
U.S.C. §101(5) (2002).
4Cunard S.S. v. Salen Reefer Servs., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985) (The guiding premise of the
Bankruptcy Code, like its predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act is the equality of distribution of assets
among creditors.).
45See supra note 23.
46 See supra note 37.
47 11 U.S.C. §304(b)(2) (2002).
48See infra text accompanying note 52.
49Based on proper methods of statutory interpretation, under the plain meaning of the statute,
subsection (b) of Section 304 uses the word "may" to describe what relief the court may grant, if it

126
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the provisions of subsection (c), American courts are required to consider
several factors in determining whether to turnover such property. 50 Subsection
(c) provides the principles by which the bankruptcy courts are to be "guided" in
5
exercising their discretion whether or not to grant relief.
'
52
form:
complete
in
Section 304(c) provides
In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of
this section, the court shall be guided by what will best assure
an economical and expeditious administration of such estate,
consistent with(1)
(2)

(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)

just treatment of all holders of claims against or
interests in such estate;
protection of claim holders in the United States
against prejudice and inconvenience in the procession
of claims in such foreign proceeding;
prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions
of property of such estate;
distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in
accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
comity; and
if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a
fresh start for the individual that such foreign
proceeding concerns.

The aim of section 304 is to promote the "economical and expeditious"
administration of the foreign estate consistent with the factors enumerated in
section 304(c). 53 While the statute accords primacy to no one of these factors,
many courts have taken a variety of approaches towards accommodating foreign
bankruptcy proceedings including emphasizing comity to the practical exclusion
of other Section 304(c) factors.54
Under this approach judges are involved in a rather extensive analyses
researching and comparing the laws of the foreign jurisdiction with those of the
Unites States and applying subjective views to already sensitive facts.55 In
chooses to grant relief at all. However, if the court chooses to grant relief, it is required to do so
"subject to the provisions of subsection (c)." This is because subsection (c) contains the word
"shall" imposing a mandate thereby leaving no room for discretion.
50 See supra note 36. § 304(c) provides in pertinent part: "In determining whether to grant relief
under subsection (b) ... the court shall be guided by what will best assure an economical and
expeditious administration of such estate..." (emphasis added).

5'See id.
52See id.
5 See id
Ronald J. Silverman, Comment, Decision-making under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Necessityfor a Balanced Approach, 7 CONN. H. INT'L L. 395 (1992).
55Silverman, supra note 53, at 399-400 ("The court in an ancillary proceeding is free to mold
appropriate relief in near blank check fashion." (citing In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621, 624 (Bankr.
5
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essence, the bankruptcy judge must decide which forum, the United States court
or the foreign jurisdiction court, should process the claims of the American
creditor. If the bankruptcy court so decides, it can remit all of the United States'
creditors to the foreign jurisdiction where the principal proceeding is filed.
Consequently, removing discretion from the hands of the American judges,
when dealing with foreign ancillary proceedings would not only facilitate the
analysis of determining which jurisdiction's laws to comply with of whether to
have the insolvent's estate administered locally or abroad, with bright line rules
but would promote the policies behind section 304 as well.
Discretion takes time and thwarts the expeditious administration of the
bankrupt's estate. It is unnecessary for the determination of whether to turnover
assets (or grant other appropriate relief) located in America to be bound by the
factors and considerations outlined in section 304(c). 56 Removing discretion
from the hands of the American bankruptcy judges will have the double benefit
of not disappointing those who are expecting precision from an analysis of these
factors because an analysis of section 304(c) factors inherently involves a
subjective interpretation and evaluation of these factors. In sum, there is no
need for a statutory mandate in turning over the foreign debtor's property
located in the United States. 7 American judges can, after evaluating factors
outlined in section 304(c), prevent a stay from being implemented. Similarly,
they can compel creditors located in America to address their claim in the
jurisdiction of the principal proceeding.
In an effort to adopt a more
homogenous and predictable outcome, there should be a general prohibition on
discretion under section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. American judges and/or
trustees should not be afforded discretion when determining whether or not the
United States will cooperate with the bankruptcy laws of the foreign jurisdiction,
i.e., the place of the principal bankruptcy proceeding.
Discretion in providing a section 304(b) remedy, e.g., in ordering the
turnover of property to the foreign representative,58 should be prohibited because
American courts should not be compelled to determine whether to grant
turnover requests.5 9 Assuming that the foreign tribunal would apply American
substantive law in the first instance, the American creditor might nonetheless be
confronted with the argument that the distribution scheme under the foreign
bankruptcy law would not recognize the American creditor's rights, particularly
one attempted after the filing of the foreign bankruptcy petition. 60 For this
S.D.N.Y.1982))). See also H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 324-325 (1977); S.Rep. No.
95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978), U.S.CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 1978, at 5787.
56See supratext accompanying note 37.
57See generally, Alexander L. Paskay, Impact of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 on Foreign
Debtors and Creditors, 12 STETSON L. REv. 321, 335 (1983).
58See Douglass G. Boshkoff, United States JudicialAssistance in CrossBorder Insolvencies, 36
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 729, 745 (1987) (The turnover of assets has been called the ultimate test of a
U.S. court's willingness to cooperate with a foreign proceeding.").
59See supranote 37.
60One such creditor's right is the right to a set off. A "set off' is defined as "a debtor's right to
reduce the amount of a debt by any sum the creditor owes the debtor; the counterbalancing sum
owed by the creditor." BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY 640 (2d ed. 2001).
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reason, such requests should generally be refused, if not for any other reason but
that the goals of section 304(c) would otherwise be overlooked.
Under the current bankruptcy law, essentially the only requirement for
being able to file bankruptcy in America is ownership of property. 61 However,
the presence of property in the United States is not a requirement for invoking
section 304.62 The district court in Haarhuisv. Kunnan Enterprises,Ltd, was
presented with a section 304 proceeding that was filed to enjoin a specific civil
contract action that was pending against the foreign debtor in that district. The
Plaintiff in the pending action argued that the bankruptcy court had no
jurisdiction under section 304 if the foreign debtor had no property or business
presence in the United States.63 The district court held that a section 304
proceeding need not meet the qualifications of a "debtor" under the Code. It
stated:
[I]n fact, to hold the presence of property in the United States to be a
jurisdictional prerequisite under section 304 would diminish much of
its usefulness as an adjunct to foreign insolvency proceedings. Foreign
representatives might have no interest in protecting a foreign debtor's
assets of negligible value, yet be vitally concerned with defending the
corpus of a foreign debtor's estate abroad against a U.S. judgment that
would likely be given recognition in the foreign proceeding. 64
Although owning property in America is not a prerequisite for
invoking section 304, many debtors that file bankruptcy in a foreign jurisdiction
also have some asset in the United States that American creditors compete to
seize to secure their claims. Allowing discretion in the hands of judges is too
risky and prejudicial to American creditors who, at the very least, may be
inconvenienced, by having to pursue their claims abroad. It is by abolishing the
discretionary mandate of section 304 to turn over the foreign debtor's property
that, even after a fair and proper assessment of section 304(c) factors, the
underlying goals of 11 U.S.C.S. §304, an economical and expeditious
administration of each estate, be fully served.

II.
SECTION 304(C) FACTORS
DETERMINING REQUESTS FOR RELIEF

AND

COMPETING

APPROACHES

FOR

11 U.S.C. §304 was designed by Congress as an efficient and less
costly alternative to commencing a plenary proceeding. It is therefore limited to
proceedings aimed at aiding the principal proceeding abroad. Among the
remedies provided for a section 304 petition is the turnover of property of the
61See supra note 6 (stating that only persons who reside, are domiciled, own property, or have a
place of business in the United States can be debtors).
62Haarhuis v. Kunnan Enters., Ltd., 223 BR. 252 (D.D.C. 1998), affld, 177 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
63See id. at 254.

64See Haarhuis,223 B.R. at 255.
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foreign estate or the proceeds of such property, to the foreign representative.
The decision to employ any of these remedies, however, must be made within
the ambit of section 304(c) factors.65
The legislative history of section 304 is helpful in its statement of the
general purpose of section 304. However, it is sparing in its specific guidance.
House and Senate Reports accompanying the legislation observe that the section
304(c) factors are "[g]uidelines ... designed to give the court maximum
flexibility in handling ancillary cases" and that "[p]rinciples of international
comity and respect for the judgments and laws of other countries suggest that
the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders under all of the
circumstances of each case, rather than being provided with inflexible rules. 66
The Congressional purpose behind section 304(c) was to mediate
67
between two conflicting approaches in dealing with international insolvencies.
Since the adoption of this section by Congress in 1978, American courts have
emphasized different factors in resolving whether cooperation with the foreign
bankruptcy proceeding is satisfactory. Among the more popularly cited factors
is comity. Comity is "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or of other person [sic] who are under the protection of its laws. 68
The underlying rationale of comity extends and ties in with another
§304(c) factor: protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice
and inconvenience in the procession of claims in such foreign proceeding.69
Courts sometimes pay particular attention to whether, under the foreign
bankruptcy law, United States creditors would have the ability to pursue their
rights to at least the extent that American courts would permit and whether the
United States creditors would be similarly protected under the foreign
bankruptcy laws.
There are three main approaches to dealing with international
bankruptcies involving multi-national
debtors and cross-border insolvencies:
70
1. Traditional approach
2. Economical and expeditious
approach 71
72
approach
3. The balanced
Under the traditional approach, the judge simply ignores the interests of
the foreign bankruptcy proceeding. This proceeding is also more commonly
65See supranote 48.
66See generally S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787.
67Maxwell Communications Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Communication Corp.), 170
BR. 800, 816 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), affd, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), afid, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d
Cir. 1996).
68
69 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
See supratext accompanying note 51.
70
See Gary Perelman, The Turnover ofAssets Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Virtues of Comity, 12 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 521, 529 (1989).

71Id. at 531.

72See Ronald J. Silverman, Decision-Making under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: The
Necessityfor a BalancedApproach,7 CoNN. J. INT'L L. 395 (1992).
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referred to as "territorialism." Here, the focus is on the United States creditors
and the concern is equal protection for the American creditors. This approach
"uses local assets to satisfy local claimants in local proceedings with little regard
for proceedings or parties elsewhere." 73 Most requests for turnover of assets are
denied under this approach especially if it can be shown that the American
creditors' claims would not receive the same priority it is entitled to under
United States law. Under this approach, while comity is not completely
disregarded, it is not given total deference either; it is within a court's discretion,
even though courts are biased against the foreign proceeding.
Under the economical and expeditious approach, the judge emphasizes
international comity to best assure the expeditious administration of the debtor's
estate.74 This approach does not deem local creditors to be a determinative
factor; rather, the focus is on international comity. It seeks to promote both
equality and maximization to recover for all creditors, irrespective of where they
are located.75
Therefore, unless the foreign based rights are substantially
prejudicial to the American creditors, the American judge will often allow
foreign courts of competent jurisdiction to adjudicate and resolve the debtor's
estate. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that deference to foreign
courts is due "whenever extending comity will neither violate domestic public
policy nor prejudice the rights of United States citizens."7 6 The mere fact that
the laws of the foreign jurisdiction
do not mirror United States' law does not
77
violate U.S. public policy.
In Emory v. Grenough, the Plaintiff was a native of Massachusetts, who
contracted a debt to the Defendant, who was also a resident of that state.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff moved to Pennsylvania, and filed a bankruptcy
petition (which, in its terms and operation, was analogous to the bankruptcy
laws of England). His debts were duly discharged, and he then returned to
Boston. Upon return, the Defendant had him arrested for the old debt. The
Plaintiff sued,78 and appealed his discharge decree. The court overruled the
plea, judgment was entered for the Plaintiff, and the Defendant subsequently
appealed. The Appellate Court held that "by the courtesy of nations, whatever
laws are carried into execution, within the limits of any government, are
considered as having the same effect everywhere, so far as they do not occasion
a prejudice to the rights of the other governments, or their citizens." 79 This full
faith and credit mentality became the grounds for what is more commonly
referred to as "universalism."80

73See Maxwell Communications, 170 B.R. at 816.
74See supra note 70, at 408.
15See Charles D. Booth, Recognition of ForeignBankruptcies:An Analysis and Critiqueof the
Inconsistent Approaches of the UnitedStates Courts, 66 Am. Bankr. L.J. 135, 138, n.9 (1992)
76Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. 369 (1797).
77Id.

78Defendant then caused the suit to be moved from State to Circuit Court.
79See Emory, 3 U.S. at 370 n.1.
'0 See Maxwell, 170 B.R. at 816.
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Finally, the balanced approach argues that the United States should
utilize and review all of the criteria set forth in Section 304(c) by Congress for
judicial consideration. A balanced approach would arguably best carry out the
legislative intent.8' In arguing that the focus on comity and essentially the
dismissal of other section 304(c) factors is wrong, Professor Ronald J.
Silverman writes:
Had the legislature intended to make comity a pre-eminent
element, it would have been simple enough to have added
comity to the initial phrasing of Section 304(c) ....
However
the legislature did not so emphasize comity; in fact, comity
was relegated to a position far down the list of factors, to
numerical position five.. .by inference it is clear that the other
factors do not represent a mere enumeration of the elements
included within the comity doctrine....82
This approach begs for an equal assessment of all factors, i.e., a more
balanced approach.
Whatever the approach adopted, all American bankruptcy courts are
guided by the purposes of section 304 to avoid a piecemeal distribution of
assets.8 3 The injunctive power of section 304 can be used to enjoin enforcement
actions that would dismember assets of the estate in the Untied States, one of the
stated purposes for a section proceeding in its legislative history.84 Removing
the discretion from the hands of American judges when deciding whether to
provide section 304 relief to the foreign trustee will not compromise the
underlying goals and policies of bankruptcy law and, in particular, section 304
petitions. Consequently, a bright line approach, that is, a nondiscretionary
scheme, should be adopted because the few detrimental effects are clearly
outweighed by the many benefits it provides.

III.

A NON-DISCRETIONARY REGIMEN

In applying section 304, bankruptcy courts have continued to show "a
distinct judicial preference for deferring to the foreign tribunal litigation
'8 5
respecting the validity or the amount of the claims against the foreign debtor.

8'See Ronald J. Silverman, 7 CONN. J. INT'L L. 395, 396.
8
2See id.
at 409-10.
83For a discussion on the general preference in the American system of avoiding a piecemeal
approach, see, Frederick Tung, Is InternationalBankruptcyPossible?, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 31, 35
(2001) ("States have traditionally pursued a territorial approach. Each state applies its own laws with
respect to the debtor's assets and creditors within its own borders. The result is a piecemeal,
territorial disposition of the firm's assets and uncoordinated, territory-based distribution of value to
creditors, in which each territory typically favors local creditors. This territorial approach has long
been the bdte noire of international bankruptcy scholars, on both efficiency and fairness grounds.").
8 See supra note 64, at 35.
85In re Rubin, 160 B.R. 269, 283 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993) (qualifying the preference on the
condition that the laws of the foreign jurisdiction are not repugnant to those of the United States and
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Notwithstanding this announced preference, section 304(c) contains factors in
addition to comity8 6 that the bankruptcy courts are directed to consider in
evaluating requests for injunctive relief. While the current law has outlined
factors to determine whether cooperation with a foreign jurisdiction for the
administration of a multi-national debtor's estate is warranted, as demonstrated
above, the approach adopted by an American Judge rests primarily on how the
underlying policies are interpreted. 87 Discretion may be most consistent with one
factor and concern outlined in the Code's section 304(c) factors. However,
discretion is unnecessary because a more objective and clinical analysis would
reach the same result. Among the two competing approaches, courts should err
on the side of adopting the territorialism approach.
Clearly, a non-discretionary regimen would run against the legislative
intent. 88 However, bankruptcy courts today continue to adopt an expansive view
of section 304 in order to give the flexible rules of the statute any effect. 89 While
discretion allows for justice to be served on a case-by-case basis, judges are also
concerned about crafting rules with minimal stretches of the law. 9° The current
approach suggests that the policy considerations that lie behind the precise
balancing of debtor and creditor interests reflected in specific provisions in the
Code will be absent from the analysis. To the contrary, under the non-discretion
scheme, that is, a "bright line" test, the true intentions of the factors outlined in
subsection (c) will be given effect. 91
There are many benefits in not allowing judges to arbitrarily decide
whether to cooperate with the bankruptcy laws of a foreign jurisdiction.92 One
such benefit is that in dealing with nations that would normally result in
American judges allowing the suit to proceed in the foreign jurisdiction,93 a
prohibition on discretion will not make a difference. Universalists might argue
that having two proceedings, one in the foreign jurisdiction and the other in the
States, is against the notions of judicial economy, because the equality of
similarly situated creditors and the economy of judicial resources are of

further, arguing that comity should be withheld only when its acceptance would be contrary or
prejudicial to the interests of the nation called upon to give it effect).
8 See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
a'See discussion supraPart II and text accompanying notes 69-71.
88See supra Part II.
89See generally Practicing Law Institute PLI Order no. A4-4389 August 5, 1992 International
Bankruptcies, Developing Practical Strategies CROSS-BORDER ISSUES BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND CANADA E. Bruce Leonard R. Gordon Marantz 628 PLI/Comm 439.
9oSee generally Chris Lenhart, Note, TowardA Midpoint Valuation StandardIn Cram Down:
Ointment For The Rash Decision, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1821, 1868 (1998) ("Adopting a system of
valuation that forgoes fact-intensive inquiries, which impose considerable transaction costs on
debtors, creditors, and the judicial system, will promote the larger bankruptcy system goals of
reducing litigation and maximizing the value in the bankruptcy estate.").
91 See, supratext accompanying note 87.
92"Arbitrarily deciding" is used to refer to the notion that discretion is, by definition, subjective.
There is no method to a judge determining whether the United States will cooperate with a foreign
jurisdiction.
93Irrespective of the approach adopted by the Judge. See generallydiscussion supra Part 11and text
accompanying notes 69-71.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol2/iss1/7

14

Kapoor: A Prohibition on Discretion Under Section 304(B) of the Bankruptc

paramount concern under a universalist approach. However, given the policy
rationales of bankruptcy law as a whole, i.e., maximum return on creditors'
investment, the benefits of such an approach are outweighed by the burdens of
judicial economy.
A case study is warranted to illustrate the effects of such an approach
where the laws of the foreign jurisdiction and the American bankruptcy laws are
parallel. When the foreign representative seeks the cooperation of the United
States to prevent American creditors from having a claim to the American assets
of the corporate debtor, section 304 is routinely invoked.94 For example, the
Bahamas' laws are nearly identical to those of the United States, and which
adopt a similar balancing approach that typically results in deference to
Bahamian law. "In balancing these frequently competing concerns, courts will
look to both the overall structure of the foreign law and the specific factual
scenario a given case presents. Overall, as some of the cases indicate, the
modem trend is to grant section 304 petitions under a much lower showing of
similarity than early section 304 cases adopted. 95 Removing discretion from the
hands of judges in a United States-Bahamas insolvency proceeding would be
more beneficial for American courts than Bahamian courts because, regardless
of where the estate is administered, in the United States or the Bahamas, the
result will be the same. The American judge, when deciding whether comity
was warranted, already determined that while the law of the foreign jurisdiction
may not be a "carbon copy" of the American system, in general, it comports
with American laws and policies. 96 In fact, only then will principles of comity
be allowed to flourish because only at that time will due regard to the foreign
laws be given.
For instance, in the often cited case, In re Culmer,97 a banking company
which did not do business in the United States at the time liquidation was
sought, but had accounts in United States banks, brought an ancillary proceeding
to the liquidation proceeding in the Bahamas under 11 U.S.C. §304. The
petition sought injunctive relief in addition to an order that property in the
United States be tumed over to the Bahamas for administration in the Bahamian
liquidation proceeding, in accordance with Bahamian law. 98 After application of
all the factors in 11 U.S.C. §304(c), the court concluded that each factor was
fulfilled; therefore, because the record was devoid of any evidence of prejudice
and the legal requirements for affording comity to Bahamian proceedings had
been satisfied, the court granted the petition. 99 The court also granted the
petition because the liquidation laws of the Bahamas were in harmony with

94See supranote 23. See also, supratext accompanying notes 22-30.

95Symposium, Civil DisclosureAnd FreezingOrders: RecoveringProperty From Overseas, 13
DICK. J. INT'L L. 479, 499 (1995).
% Id.
97In re Culmer, 25 Bankr. 621 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. 1982). In re Culmer was the first case to rule on a
turnover order under §304.
98Id.at 623.
99Id.at 627.
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those of the United States. Specifically, the court stated, "[t]his Court is
satisfied that the Bahamian proceeding is inherently fair and regular." 100
The court further announced that in its view the central issue for
determination in a section 304 proceeding was whether the relief sought would
afford equality of distribution of the available assets.'O The court found that the
Bahamian proceeding satisfied both the principle of equality of distribution and
the individual factors enumerated in section 304(c).' 0 2 The analysis of the
Culmer court prompted the observation that section 304 grants bankruptcy
courts the authority to mold relief "in near blank check fashion."' 1 3 According
to the court, allowing these creditors to prevail over the relief requested by the
Bahamian liquidators "would grant them preferences to which they were not
entitled either in a Bahamian liquidation.. .or in a United States bankruptcy."'10 4
A tangential benefit from such an approach is the prevention
of a race to the bottom. 10 5 In the absence of a bright line rule
prohibiting the use of discretion in determining whether to grant a
foreign representative's request to implement automatic stay, a similar
race to the bottom is feared in this context as well.
The term 'race-to-the-bottom' refers to a progressive
relaxation of standards, spurred by interstate competition to
attract industry, that also occasions a reduction in social
welfare below the levels that would exist in the absence of
such competition. The widely accepted theoretical model for
the race-to-the-bottom is non-cooperative game theory, of
which the classic Prisoner's Dilemma is perhaps the most
well-known example. According to this model, although all
states would be better off if they each cooperated with each
other by collectively maintaining optimally stringent
standards, the incentives are such that each state will instead
relax its standards
in an ultimately unsuccessful bid to attract
6
industry.10
If "American" corporations are allowed to file bankruptcy in a nation
other than the United States, American creditors risk losing control of American
assets. 0 7 Add to it the possibility that American judges might over value comity
and defer to the foreign jurisdiction, American creditors are severely crippled in

100
Id.
10 Id.at 628.
102

id.

03

Id. at 624.
104
Id.at 629.
'

10'
See generally, Kirsten H. Engel, State EnvironmentalStandard-Setting:Is There A "Race"And Is
It "To The Bottom, "48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997).

274. text accompanying
107Id.
See atsupra
note 64.
106
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the "race to grab."'' 08 A race to grab is one where creditors are permitted to
obtain judicial liens on account of existing debts before other creditors or take
property from the debtor. The race includes both physical grabs of property and
grabs of judicial liens.' 0 9 The United States would be compelled to provide
incentives to these corporations to file bankruptcy locally, in order to encourage
American filings and to serve the policies and purposes of Bankruptcy law. 10
For this reason, a non-discretionary regimen would be the optimal solution, as it
would prevent a weakening of the American laws to match or parallel the
foreign laws. 1 A race to the bottom should be averted.
When a foreign nation is indifferent to the idea of corporate debtors
filing for bankruptcy in the United States (or for that matter even urges them to
file in the States), and the debtor files in the United States, Section 304 of the
Bankruptcy Code no longer applies." 2
Instead, a plenary bankruptcy
proceeding is sought for the proper and complete resolution of the debtor's
estate. When this occurs, a race to the bottom is averted in that American laws
are no longer3 forced to weaken their laws to match those of the foreign
competitors."
On the other hand, a foreign representative can, at his option,
commence an involuntary case" 4 which would trigger an automatic stay.
However, under this scenario, the foreign representative would be an ordinary
creditor with an interest in all assets, including those located in America.
Moreover even if the foreign representative decides to pursue this alternative of
filing a full scale involuntary petition under 11 U.S.C. §303(b)(4) thereby
triggering automatic stay, section 304 would not become applicable because
section 304 only plays a role in ancillary proceedings. Automatic stay would5
require that the principal proceeding be held in the United States."
1o8
Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, TransnationalBankruptcies: The Section 304 And Beyond, 1993
COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 329, 353-354 (1993) ("Forum selection in a universal system becomes more a
question of convenience to the parties than a race to grab the property.").
109For a general discussion on "race to grab," see, John K. Londot, Note and Comment, Handling
PriorityRules Conflicts In InternationalBankruptcy: Assessing The InternationalBar Association's
Concordat, 13 BANKR. DEV. J. 163, 171-172 (1996).
11 See supranotes 2, 11-14 and accompanying text.
1 See supranote 108 at 173 n.57 (stating that "[i]n the international context, the race is not only
among ordinary creditors, but also among national jurisdictions. While creditors protect their
interests by moving as quickly as possible in their respective countries, the corresponding courts
protect their national public policies by moving as quickly as possible to gain adjudicative power
over
debtors' assets before those assets are removed by debtor or foreign court action.").
2
11 See supranotes 27-30 and accompanying text.
113See supranote 108.
"4 11 U.S.C. §303(b)(4) provides, in complete
form, as follows:
"An involuntary case against a person is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this title- ...
(4) by a foreign representative of the estate in a foreign proceeding concerning such
person."
The Revision Notes and Legislative Reports comment that a foreign representative may file an
involuntary case concerning the debtor in the foreign proceeding, in order to administer assets in this
country.
'" See supranotes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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Under section 362 of the current Bankruptcy Code, it is required that
hearings on motions for relief from the stay be held expeditiously to determine
the issues arising out of the estate. In general, section 362 provides for an
automatic stay immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 1 6 It
prevents the continuation or commencement of any action or proceeding against
the debtor, the enforcement of any judgment against it or its property, any act to
obtain possession of its property or to exercise control over it, and any act to
create or enforce a lien against the property. 17 The rights of the parties affected
by the stay are not extinguished but merely held in abeyance while the debtor
endeavors to effect a satisfactory method of providing the creditors 1with
relief,
8
or its equivalence, as ultimately determined by the bankruptcy court.
The United States Bankruptcy Court in that instance, may terminate,
annul or modify the stay for cause, including the lack of adequate protection or
if the debtor does not have equity in the property and it is not necessary to an
effective reorganization. 119 The Court may also lift the automatic stay if it finds
that the petition was filed in bad faith. In this instance, discretion should not
only be allowed but it should be heavily employed in dismissing the frivolous
suit.
In this scenario, the foreign representative will not have to request
injunctive or other relief because the automatic stay would enjoin creditor
actions in the United States. 20 If a nation of competent jurisdiction, such as the
Bahamas, allows the corporate debtor to file bankruptcy in America under the
theory that its main objective is only to have corporations incorporate there,
section 304, in that case, would be rendered moot because the principal place of
bankruptcy would be here in the United States. In such a situation the interests
of American creditors would continue to be protected and the policies and
underlying goals of American Bankruptcy law would not be compromised. 2'
Therefore, in order to prevent a race to the bottom and in order to protect the
rights and interests of creditors situated in America, there needs to be a general
prohibition on use of judicial discretion in granting relief from liabilities to a
debtor who files bankruptcy here in the States.
Another benefit to removing judicial discretion regarding whether to
cooperate with the bankruptcy laws of a foreign nation is precisely that it would
make judges' decisions less capricious. Where there is even the slightest
discrepancy in the laws of the United States and that of the foreign nation, under
a strict non-discretionary regimen, it will not be left up to the judge to decide
whether to abide by principles of comity or not. Several bankruptcy courts have
refused to defer to foreign insolvency schemes that would not accord claims of

16

See supranote 33.

117Id.

118
Id.
119
See supra note 33.
120See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
121See id.
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an American
holder a priority comparable to that accorded those claims under
1 22
the Code.
For instance, Canada is one nation whose bankruptcy laws are different
from those of the United States. Since Canadian law categorizes various
creditors and assigns different levels of priority to each,12 3 occasionally,
American creditors with a claim to the assets of a Canadian debtor are not
afforded the same level of priority and are thereby prejudiced. 124 Although it
may be difficult to imagine a situation where the American judge will allow the
turnover of assets located in America to a Canadian representative, under a nondiscretionary protocol, the "difficulty" would be eliminated completely. Under
this approach,1 25 Canadian representatives would have notice that American
judges will not even have the opportunity to analyze their claims based on
factors in section 304(c) of American Bankruptcy Law including comity.
In In Re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 26 the bankruptcy trustee of a Canadian debtor
petitioned for an injunction against all of the debtor's creditors from
commencing any action against the debtor or its assets. The American
bankruptcy court held that comity required that the claim of the American lien
creditor against the debtor be litigated in Michigan courts. 27 The American
122See In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (claim of U.S. lien creditor

against foreign creditor against foreign debtor must be litigated in U.S. Court); In re Lineas Aereas
de Nicaragua S.A., 10 Bankr. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981) (U.S. assets may be used only to satisfy
claims of U.S. creditors); In re Berthoud, 231 F. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (U.S. Court had jurisdiction
to commence involuntary bankruptcy proceeding against foreign debtor whose only major U.S.
contact was a U.S. $30,000 bank account; Disconto Gesellschafi v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570 (1908)
(United States must protect the rights of its own citizens to local property before permitting property
to be removed from its jurisdiction; Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (holding that comity is not
to be extended if it would violate the laws and public policy of the United States to do so). But see
Comfeld v. Investors Overseas Servs., 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that the
Canadian winding up procedures were jurisdictionally sound and consistent with U.S. bankruptcy
policy); Clarkson v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1976) (acknowledging Canadian bankruptcy
trustee's claim to records of debtor located in the United States because right of foreign trustee will
be recognized as long as court has jurisdiction over bankrupt and there is no prejudice to local
creditors or violation of laws or public policy of the state); Waxman v. Kealoha, 296 F. Supp. 1190
(D. Haw. 1969) (Canadian bankruptcy trustee could bring an action in bankruptcy against Hawaiian
incorporators and stockholders of Hawaiian corporation to recover amounts owed on stock
subscriptions, because U.S. Courts typically extend comity in such cases, unless to do so would
prejudice local creditors); Canada Southern Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527 (1883) (refusing to
allow U.S. bondholders of a Canadian corporation in reorganization to sue on their bonds).
123See Bankruptcy Act, R.S.C., ch. B-3 §107 (1970) (Can.). Section 107 of the Canadian
Bankruptcy Act divides creditors into four classes for purposes of priority distribution. First, there
are secured creditors who are entitled to enforce their claims irrespective of their debtors'
bankruptcy proceedings. Second, preferred creditors receive a special priority by virtue of Section
107(a) through (j), and they share pari passu as among preferred creditors in any particular sub-class
of preferred creditors. Third, ordinary creditors are those creditors among which no distinction is
made as to judgment creditors and non-judgment creditors. However, judgment creditors are not
treated as possessing any security. Fourth, and finally, deferred creditors are those creditors who, as
a matter of policy, receive no payment unless and until all other creditors are paid.
124
See, e.g., note 125 and accompanying text.
,25See supranotes 69-71 and accompanying text.
126
In Re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 Bankr. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
2

. Id. at 168.
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Court took judicial notice of the close geographic proximity of Canada and the
United States, specifically, Wayne County, Michigan and Essex County,
Province of Ontario and held that the American creditor would not be
inconvenienced by litigating its claim in Canada, and that the American claim
would receive just treatment of its claim against the debtor in Canadian
courts.
However, the claim would not receive the priority recognition
"substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this title" as required
by Section 304(c)(4). 129 Based on the perceived failure of the Canadian law to
provide the judgment lien creditor any priority for its claim, the bankruptcy
court ruled that the turnover request should not be granted. It specifically
rejected the argument that the principle of comity should control, noting that
section 304(c) contained a number of factors for a bankruptcy court to
consider. 130
The holding in Toga was widely criticized and commentators are still
split in their views. Universalists criticize Toga as an approach that emphasizes
131
territorialist factors in section 304(c) in contrast to the approach in Culmer
32
that emphasizes the universalist factors in section 304(c).1 Adopting a nondiscretionary scheme of statutory interpretation will avoid these differences of
opinion.
Unlike the Judge's opinion in In Re Toga Mfg. Ltd, under the nondiscretionary interpretation scheme, the decision to adjudicate the claim in the
United States will not be based on the discretionary exercise of comity or a
balancing approach involving the remaining five factors; rather, the claim will
be litigated in the United States because of a statutory mandate that prescribes
an outcome for a basic skeleton of facts. Consequently, a general prohibition on
discretion under 33
section 304 will not violate any policy of the American
Bankruptcy Law.1
34
Similarly, in Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shaheen,1
a New York court issued
a temporary injunction ordering the Canadian corporate officials to turn over
corporate records to the Canadian bankruptcy trustee. The American court held,
inter alia, that there was indeed a reason for the court to recognize the Canadian
bankruptcy. The court held that comity required the New York courts to
recognize the statutory title of an alien trustee in bankruptcy "as long as the
foreign court had jurisdiction of the bankrupt and the foreign proceedinghas not
resulted in injustice to New York citizens, prejudice to creditors' New York
statutory remedies, or violation of the laws or public policy of the state."
(Emphasis added).135
28Id. at 170-71.

129See supranote 126.
130See supranote 127.
131See supranote 96.

132
See generally Charles D. Booth, Recognitionof ForeignBankruptcies: An analysis and Critique
of the Inconsistent Approaches of the UnitedStates Courts, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 135, 172 (1992).
133
See supranote 2 (including fresh start for debtor and an equitable distribution to unsecured
creditors).
134See Clarkson Co., Ltd. v. Shahen, 544 F. 2d 624 (2d. Cir. 1976).
131
Id.at 629.
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A general prohibition on discretion under section 304 will reconcile
and facilitate the handling of significant differences in the substantive
bankruptcy laws of the various countries. It will also reduce, if not avoid
completely, the temperamental recognition of foreign bankruptcy proceedings
by some countries. In addition, the lack of certainty as to which jurisdictions'
bankruptcy law will apply until the proceedings are actually commenced will be
minimized in the case of a multi-jurisdictional bankruptcy. Overall, the
adoption of this approach will increase the probability that a desirable
jurisdiction will administer certain assets. And perhaps most importantly, such
an approach raises the chances that a specific creditor will have a higher yield on
their investment than they otherwise would. Furthermore, under this regimen,
American creditors will not have to forego the protections that they have
traditionally provided their own participants, including, for example local
employees and local tax authorities.13 6 The analysis, however, does not end
there.
This approach is not without flaws; therefore, it faces much criticism.
One possible criticism is that this approach is hostile towards United States'
relations with other nations. This is because it fails to consider the benefits that
other jurisdictions might offer. For example, depending on the foreign
jurisdiction, generally, a secured creditor in that jurisdiction may realize on its
collateral considerably sooner than in the United States where secured creditors
are stayed from action along with all other creditors.
Under such an approach, the benefits of the foreign jurisdiction are
overlooked because it fails to imagine a situation where the American creditors
may be better off than they are in the United States. Nevertheless, while this
approach may deny the American creditors any additional advantages from
pursuing their claims abroad, the situations where they will receive additional
perks are few and far between to forego the entire approach for a discretionary
protocol.
Another criticism against this scheme is that rather than avoiding
multiple "territorial" proceedings, it creates and encourages them thereby
impeding the creation of a universal bankruptcy scheme. This is contrary to
settled notions of judicial economy. 137 The ancillary proceedings, under section
306 of the Bankruptcy Code, 138 allow a foreign party to appear for the ancillary
proceedings without submitting itself to the jurisdiction of any other United
136
See generally Donald T. Trautman et al., FourModelsfor InternationalBankruptcy, 41 AM. J.
COMP. L. 573, 606 (1993).
137See Jay Lawrence Westbook, Choice ofAvoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 BROOK. J.
INT'L L, 449, 514 (1991).
"s 11 U.S.C. §306 (1988). §306 provides, in complete form, as follows:
306. Limited appearance
An appearance in a bankruptcy court by a foreign representative in connection with a
petition or request under section 303, 304, or 305 of this title does not submit such
foreign representative to the jurisdiction of any court in the United States for any other
purpose, but the bankruptcy court may condition any order under section 303, 304, or 305
of this title on compliance by such foreign representative with the orders of such
bankruptcy court.
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States' court. 139 An ancillary proceeding, rather than commencing a full-scale
bankruptcy proceeding only provides specific relief' 40 Furthermore, they are
limited to only certain circumstances.' 4 1 As a result, they are generally more
efficient, flexible, and expeditious than a full-scale liquidation or reorganization
proceeding. These benefits are certainly not to be dismissed because they "are
the U.S. contribution toward creating a workable 'universal' bankruptcy scheme
that avoids multiple 'territorial' proceedings if possible."' 142 Yet, by granting
discretion in the hands of judges, the interests of American creditors should not
be dismissed simply for matters of judicial economy. This is disparaged
because it cannot guarantee that waste of assets will be minimized because of
the multiple proceedings.
Moreover, while costs of multiple proceedings are possibly saved under
a discretionary approach because only a few claims (as opposed to all) are
settled in the United States courts. It is certain that the rigid non-discretionary
approach is invaluable to creditors because they generally make a bigger
investment by lending money and/or credit to these corporate debtors. In
addition, sometimes, a multiple proceeding may be unavoidable if
43 assets are
located in jurisdictions where principles of comity are not followed. 1
In addition, under a scheme where there is a general prohibition on
discretion, there are many obstacles for the reorganization of a failing
multinational enterprise or for coordinated asset sales particularly on a going
concern basis. In the more common liquidation scenario, this approach prompts
a race to national courthouses by creditors and produces unequal distributions
among creditors depending upon the fortuity of the location of debtor assets.

IV.

RESOLUTION

A.

Move towards the Dilution of 1I U.S.C. §304

In 2001, the Second Circuit expressed its preference for the secondary
approach in its landmark opinion, Bank of New York v. Treco.144 In this case,
the Second Circuit vacated decisions by a district court and a bankruptcy court
that ordered the turnover to a foreign proceeding (Bahamas) of property alleged
Id.

139

140
See supra note 88 at 200. Ancillary proceedings allow the court to mold relief in almost

unlimited form: (1) The court may enjoin the commencement or continuation of any action against
the debtor with respect to property involved in the foreign proceeding or any action against such
property. 11 U.S.C. §304(b)(1). (2) The court may order turnover of property, or its proceeds,
belonging to the debtor's estate to the Foreign Representative. 11 U.S.C. §304(b)(2).
3. The court may abstain from adjudication of any matters, or suspend or dismiss all proceedings,
relating to the foreign debtor and its property. 11 U.S.C. §305.
4. Examples of Other Appropriate Relief. 11 U.S.C. §304(bX3).

See id.
See supra note 41 at 200.
143id.
141
142

144Bank of New York v. Treco (In re Treco), 240 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 200 1).
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to be subject to a security interest in the United States. The creditor holding the
security interest argued that under the law of the foreign proceeding, its security
interest would be subordinated to various statutory priorities, including
administrative expenses, and that the distribution in the foreign proceeding
would thus not be "substantially in accordance with the order prescribed" by the
Code. 1 45 The Second Circuit ruled that the district court had not properly
applied section 304(c). 14 6 The Second Circuit also said that while comity is the
ultimate consideration in granting relief under section 304, it does not
automatically override the other factors listed in section 304(c). 147 This decision
came down as Congress was already moving toward possible action on a new
set of provisions
to govern ancillary cases and other cross-border insolvency
48
matters.
The Second Circuit analyzed the Treco case based primarily on section
304(c)(4). 149 In analyzing the language of section 304(c)(4), the Second Circuit
also confirmed the commonly accepted view that the distribution rules of a
foreign jurisdiction need not be identical to those of the United States to satisfy
section 304(c)(4); the same foreign priority rules may be substantially in
accordance with the United States laws.' 50 Under a non-discretionary approach,
it makes sense that even if the laws of the competing jurisdictions are identical,
or even "substantially similar," then we must look to accommodate American
creditors' convenience.
The interpretation given to section 304(c)(4) by the Second Circuit
recognizes that a foreign bankruptcy regime might be fair overall in its treatment
of creditors, but significantly diverge from the Code in its treatment of any
particular class of claim holders.' 51 Overall fairness is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for deference under section 304(c), if a particular class of
actual United States' claim holders would be52 significantly disadvantaged by the
distribution rules of the foreign proceeding.
B.

ProposedChapter 15

The United States Congress is currently reviewing a proposal by the
House of Representatives 153 which would seek to affect the way ancillary
proceedings are initiated and conducted in United States courts. The versions of
the bankruptcy reform legislation if passed by the Senate and the House
provides for the addition of a new Chapter 15 to Title 11 of the United States
145See

supranotes 52-53.

14 See
14"See
141See
141See

Treco, 240 F.3d at 151.
id. at 156.
infra Part IV. B.
Treco, 240 F.3d at 155 ("The primary dispute on appeal is whether the bankruptcy and
district courts properly analyzed the factors under § 304(c) in deciding whether to grant turnover.").
'50See id. at 158-59.
151See id.
152Id.
153See supra note 42.
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Code. 154 Chapter 15 would govern the initiation and conduct of ancillary
proceedings in substitution for the provisions currently contained in Section
304. 155
As to ancillary proceedings, the provisions of Chapter 15 would build
upon the provisions of section 304 but with clarifications and changes that will
affect the conduct and perhaps the outcome of particular ancillary proceedings.
Besides making revisions to the definitions already contained in the Code,
Chapter 15 also adds its own list of defined terms for use in proceedings under
the new Chapter.1 56 Among other things, this Chapter would also distinguish
between a foreign main proceeding and a foreign non-main proceeding. It
would also thereby introduce a level of complexity to the recognition process
that is not readily apparent from the language of the initial sections of Chapter
15 that govern the recognition process. Section 1504 provides that an ancillary
case is commenced under Chapter 15 by the filing of a petition for recognition
of a foreign proceeding under Section 1515.157
The distinction between a foreign main and non-main proceeding leads
to another change: a mandatory recognition rule.' 58 Section 1517(a) would
make recognition of a foreign proceeding mandatory if the foreign proceeding
and foreign representative meet the definitional requirements of the Code and if
the filing requirements of section 1515 are met.' 59 The bankruptcy court under
the new Chapter 15 would not have the same freedom although there is a limited
basis in section 1517(a) to deny recognition to a foreign proceeding. 60 Section
1517 is expressly made subject to section 1506. Section 1506 provides that
"[n]othing in this chapter prevents the court from refusing to take an action
governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public
policy of the United States."1 6 1 Ultimately, if recognition of a foreign
proceeding would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the United
States, a court could decline to enter an order recognizing the foreign
proceeding.
Another significant change with the adoption of this new Chapter is
that under Chapter 15, recognition of a foreign proceeding, as a foreign main
proceeding will have automatic effects. 62 This is a change in the operation of
an ancillary proceeding from that under section 304 where there is no automatic
stay and where all relief is discretionary and must be court ordered. The stakes
for United States creditors in an ancillary proceeding under Chapter 15 will be
significantly increased by virtue of the recognition of a foreign proceeding
without regard for the section 304(c) factors. Although mandatory recognition
"4 H.R. REP. No. 107-3, pt. 1 (2001), accompanying H.R. 333, contains an explanation of the
changes and additions made to the Model Law to incorporate it into the Code.
1"'OS.C. §1501(b)(1).
1'6U.S.C. § 1501(b)(2), (3) & (4).
117U.S.C. §1504.

""U.S.C. §1517.
"9 U.S.C. §1517(a).
16 U.S.C. §1506.
161Id

162
U.S.C. §1520(a)(1)&(2).
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means that a foreign main proceeding will be entitled to the benefits of an
automatic stay even though the foreign proceeding might not satisfy the section
304(c) factors.
As it pertains to this new law, the non-discretionary regimen would not
be impeded in any substantial way since most changes deal with definitions.
The bill, in effect, would allow a foreign representative to file a petition directly
with a court for recognition of a foreign proceeding. Another solution is that
creditors should choose a debtor with the greatest interests within the preferred
jurisdiction and/or obtain guarantees hopefully secured and properly authorized,
from an entity with substantial interests within the preferred jurisdiction.
C.

Alternative Remedy--A Happy Medium

Some critics and commentators might argue that this approach is too
strong. However, even if this approach is found to be "too" absolute and a
draconian measure to the narrow situation outlined in the Introduction above, the
policies and concerns should not be dismissed.
A hypothetical is needed to illustrate the effects: A debtor corporation
is incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction. It owns a piece of land in that foreign
nation. In order to develop on the land, it borrows from a lender from that
jurisdiction. During the term of the loan, the debtor, though solvent, files a
bankruptcy proceeding in the foreign jurisdiction. In this situation, a bright-line
rule would preclude American courts from considering the individual
transaction to determine if the interests of the creditors in the United States (if
any) are really being challenged. The non-discretionary regimen would
probably be quite drastic.
For such situations, if Congress decides that the current state of
Bankruptcy Law as it relates to ancillary proceedings, needs to be improved
given the concerns mentioned in this Note, at the very least, a presumptionbased system would be the best way to accomplish this improvement.
Rebuttable presumptions, rather than bright lines, would provide greater
guidance to the judge than the current guided discretionary system, and would
thereby tend to reduce the risk of improper exercises of discretion. At the same
time, rebuttable presumptions would preserve some discretion and thereby avoid
the serious comparative justice consequences of a bright line rule. In the final
analysis, a presumption-based system would help to achieve better results, or
results that depend on the specific facts and circumstances of the foreign
representative's case rather than on factors referenced in section 304(c) of the
Code. This presumption strikes a balance between fixed rules and judicial
discretion that errs on the side of caution. By giving bankruptcy judges a clear,
"bright-line" rule, the potential for inconsistency, unpredictability, and inequity
are minimized.
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CONCLUSION

The ultimate relief available in an ancillary case, the turnover of
property to the foreign representatives, would remain a discretionary exercise
under the proposed Chapter 15 as it is under § 304. This power is found in
U.S.C. §1521(b), which provides that:
Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, whether main or
nonmain, the court may, at the request of the foreign
representative, entrust the distribution of all or part of the
debtor's assets located in the United States to the foreign
representative or another person, including an examiner,
authorized by the court, provided that the court is satisfied that
the interests of creditors in the United States are sufficiently
protected.
Under a non-discretionary regimen, where there would be a
general prohibition on a judge's discretion under section 304(b),
instead of a statutory test for the turnover of assets, there would be a
bright line rule conforming to the purposes and policies of bankruptcy
law in the first place. The bright line rule would simply state that an
American company filing a principal bankruptcy proceeding in a
foreign jurisdiction will either have to file a companion "principal" full
blown proceeding in the States or risk the American creditors attaching
to assets located in the United States.
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